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Abstract—Recently, the IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) Cloud (e.g., Amazon EC2) has been widely used by many organizations. 
However, some IaaS security issues create serious threats to its users. A typical issue is the timing channel. This kind of channel can be a 
cross-VM information channel, as proven by many researchers. Because it is covert and traceless, the traditional identification methods 
cannot build an accurate analysis model and obtain a compromised result. We investigated the underlying behavior of the timing channel 
from the perspective of the memory activity records and summarized the signature of the timing channel in the underlying memory activities. 
An identification method based on long-term behavior signatures was proposed. We proposed a complete set of forensics steps including 
evidence extraction, identification, record reserve, and evidence reports. We studied four typical timing channels, and the experiments 
showed that these channels can be detected and investigated, even with disturbances from normal processes. 
Index Terms—timing channel, digital investigation, IaaS security  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
ecently, there has been significant attention drawn to the 
security of the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud [1], 
since a compromised cloud may pose a threat to multiple cloud-
backend application domains [2, 3]. A particular focus is on the 
timing channel [4, 5]. Ristenpart et al. [6] first proposed cross-VM 
timing channels in the cloud environment. They stated that any 
physical machine resources multiplexed between the attacker and 
the target might form a potential leakage channel between the 
virtual machines. Recent studies show that this kind of attack can 
successfully steal from co-resident VM instances some private 
information, including private keys, which are set up by key 
management schemes [7, 8, 9]. 
To prevent the timing channel, some protection mechanisms 
have been proposed. sHype [10] is a mandatory access control 
(MAC)-based security extension to the Xen hypervisor that allows 
the application of various security policies on VMs. Lares [11] 
presented a hybrid approach, giving security tools the ability to 
actively monitor while benefitting from the increased security 
of an isolated virtual machine. They all focus on providing an 
integrity measurement to the hypervisor by introducing a 
software component. 
However, these protection mechanisms may fail because the 
timing channel is created by sharing resources. These mechanisms 
observe behaviors of a VM by monitoring hypercalls in a 
hypervisor and look for the regularity in the system operation 
records. The system operations records obtained are an abstracted 
behavior of the system layer. The information they contain is not 
complete. Timing channels use time information from shared 
resources, which are not reflected by the general system operation 
records. In this paper, we propose a behavior observation mode on 
memory access activity. The lower memory activity records, which 
provide crucial evidence for forensics and a good basis for further 
analysis, can also provide complete information to understand the 
behavior of the timing channel process. 
The presence of a timing channel is difficult to identify. It 
can run continuously without leaving a trace or an alarm. All 
behaviors on the timing channel are legal and normal. This creates 
challenges to their identification and forensics. After careful 
investigation, we found that, although single behavior is normal, 
the timing channel shows regular patterns in long-term behaviors. 
These signatures provide a good basis for our automatic detection 
and forensic feature. 
In this paper, only cross-VM timing channels new to IaaS are 
considered. Four typical scenarios (e.g. CPU load based, Cache 
based, shared memory based channels, IP timing channel) are 
demonstrated, and their features are studied in-depth. We present 
an identification method in IaaS and introduce an investigation on 
the timing channel. Our method includes three steps. First, to 
record the behavior of the timing channel, a page-level memory 
record and packet record are designed. Second, an automatic 
identification algorithm is proposed based on the timing channel’s 
long-term behavior. Finally, a memory dump will be obtained, and 
the binary code of suspicious processes will be analyzed for the 
forensics scheme.  
A prototype system was implemented on Xen. The 
effectiveness of identifying the four typical timing channels was 
investigated. Meanwhile, we attempted to identify a cache-based 
side-channel attack and simulate a flush-reload [12] attack to 
extract the private encryption keys from GnuPG. The experiment 
results show that our system can identify these channels, even with 
the disturbances from normal processes, and the introduced 
overhead is up to 42% in the worst case, which is lower compared 
to current methods. 
This paper makes the following contributions: 
 We introduce memory activity records, which provide a 
good basis for the timing channel and can extract 
meaningful information. The time information of the 
memory record reflects the behavior of the timing 
channel. 
 We summarize the behavior signature of the timing 
channel based on the investigation of long-term 
behavior activities on the memory activity. We build a 
precise analysis model and design an automatic 
identification algorithm. 
 We implemented a complete set of forensic tools. Based 
on the recognition function, we add the evidence 
acquisition reservation and analysis, which achieves the 
forensic schema for the timing channel in the cloud. 
R 
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 We built our prototype system on the Xen platform and 
tested it with four typical time channels. Additionally, 
we compared identification algorithms from similar 
works in our experiments and introduced an analysis 
method for memory activity records from packet 
records on the network timing channel. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses the related work. Section 3 describes the timing channel 
threat in the cloud. Section 4 describes the long-term identification. 
In Section 5, an overview of the prototype system is given. Section 
6 describes the experiment and evaluation. Our paper concludes in 
Section 7. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Recently, several efforts have been made. A typical proposal 
is a hardware-based solution [13]. However, these solutions have 
high costs and latency. Considering this, [5] HomeAlone was 
designed to proactively detect the co-residence of unfriendly VMs 
to offer immediately deployable protections to the IaaS. It detected 
the presence of a malicious VM by acting as a timing channel 
receiver and observing the cache timing anomalies caused by 
another receiver’s activities. Different from HomeAlone, 
XenPump [14] placed hooks into the Xen hypervisor monitored 
hypercalls and added latencies to mitigate the threat from the 
timing channels. 
Currently, the main detection method focuses on the timing 
channel behavior. For instance, C2Hunter [15] presented a two-
phase synthesis detection algorithm using Markov and Bayesian 
models based on error-corrected four-state automation, which 
modeled the timing channel scenario in cloud computing. [16] 
used a directed information flow graph, taking advantage of the 
source code analysis to detect the timing channel. 
In [17], the authors illustrated the threat from IP covert timing 
channels and developed two methods for detecting IP covert timing 
channels by identifying the regularity of the inter-transmission 
times. These methods worked well for noiseless channels but failed 
with a high level of noise. 
Compared to HomeAlone, our method not only detects the 
existence of malicious behavior but also collects related evidence 
of these timing channels. Several papers [18,19,20] have studied 
related security issues. In addition, different from XenPump, our 
method does not insert additional modules into the hypervisor. We 
use the EPT (Extended Page Table) modification interface [21] 
supplied by Xen in dom0 to monitor the memory activity and place 
a hook on the NIC to retrieve packet information. Compared with 
the C2Hunter [15] and [16], our method focuses on the underlying 
view of single process memory activities, which have more 
specific and useful information. This not only allows our method 
to have a higher detection rate but also significantly reduces the 
false positives rate. 
Our work concentrates on investigating (including evidence 
collection and analysis) timing channels in IaaS. Research on how 
to investigate them after identification is necessary. We have not 
found any other work on this issue. 
3. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
3.1 Timing channel in IaaS 
IaaS refers to online services that abstract the user from the 
details of the infrastructure such as physical computing resources, 
location, data partitioning, scaling, security, backup, etc. Although 
virtualization technology provides strong isolation for the cloud, 
the service provider is a shared infrastructure. One of the problems 
introduced by a shared environment to IaaS is the timing channel. 
The main idea of the timing channel is that every logical operation 
in a computer takes time to execute, and the time can differ based 
on the shared environment in the IaaS. With precise measurements 
of the time for each operation, an attacker can work backward to 
the shared environment [5]. The most convenient resources are a 
CPU, cache, memory, and a network, which makes the timing 
channel more effective. 
In this paper, only the cache-based, load-based, and shared 
memory belonging to cross-VM channels are considered. We 
classified them into local channel categories. 
Local channel: Malicious processes Pi and Pj are located on 
the same hardware platform. Pi leaks confidential information to 
the Pj using the timing channel through shared local resources (e.g., 
cache, shared memory, CPU load.). They encode messages into the 
time information of the shared source such as cache access latency, 
memory access latency, etc. [4, 22, 23]. 
Network channel: Malicious processes Pk and Px 
communicate with each other through the network resource. The 
confidential information is encoded into the different packet time 
intervals. They are located on different domains or in different 
hardware platforms, which makes it easier to implement and create 
more significant threats (e.g., IP timing channel) [17]. 
3.2 Threat scenarios of timing channel 
CPU load-based channels. [23] These can be approximated 
using the amount of time taken for certain computations. The 
confidential information is pre-encoded into a binary sequence. 
The sender and receiver transfer information by changing and 
observing the CPU load according to a certain communication 
protocol. For example, a long waiting time to complete a task 
transmits bit 1, otherwise, bit 0 is transmitted. 
Cache-based channels. [4] The cache-based channel 
considers the different cache access latencies as different bits. The 
sender uses the idle cache access as transmitting bit 0 and the 
frequent accesses to a memory block as transmitting bit 1. The 
receiver accesses a memory block and observes the access 
latencies. High latency indicates the sender is removing the 
receiver’s data from the cache, and bit 1 is transmitted; otherwise, 
bit 0 is transmitted. 
Shared memory-based channels. [22] The shared memory-
based channel considers different memory access intervals as 
different bits. The sender sends covert messages by controlling the 
data sending time, and the receiver receives the message by 
observing the data arrival time. The confidential information is 
encoded into the different intervals. For example, bit 1 and bit 0 
denote longer and shorter intervals. 
IP timing channel. [17] The receiver and sender agree on a 
time interval and the starting protocol. During each time interval, 
the sender either transmits a single packet or maintains silence. The 
receiver and sender also agree on a different time interval. The 
sender transmits a single packet with a different time interval. The 
receiver monitors the interval between adjacent packets to decode 
the message. 
3.3 Challenges 
In recent studies, the timing channel has been modeled using 
transitional behavior analysis methods, such as system operation 
analysis and tainted analysis. However, it is difficult to construct 
an accurate analysis model because of its misinterpretation of the 
behavior semantics, which reduces the recognition rate and 
increases the false alarm rate. Meanwhile, the isolation mechanism 
of the cloud makes forensics more difficult and exposes the 
existence of monitoring procedures, leading to an anti-forensic 
response. To identify and investigate the timing channel in the 
cloud, we need solve the following challenges: 
 How to extract meaningful information. The timing 
channel is concerned with the timing information. All of 
its behaviors are ordinary user behavior, such as reading 
files, loading programs, etc., which makes it difficult for 
the traditional behavior log records to correctly express 
their real purpose. To obtain valuable information, we 
must find another way to express the timing channel 
behavior information. This paper presents a method 
based on memory activity records analysis to express 
the processes of the timing channel. 
 There is still no accurate analysis model for the local 
channel. In the existing research, the local channel is 
analyzed using the system behavior or the information 
flow. Due to the concealment of the time information, 
the analysis model constructed from the traditional 
behavior analysis makes accurate identification difficult 
and leads to a high false alarm rate. To solve this, we 
summarize the long-term behavior signature of the 
timing channel based on the memory activity records 
and build an accurate model with a high recognition rate. 
 How to investigate in the cloud environment under 
isolated conditions without being discovered by the 
customer. The isolation of the cloud environment 
makes it necessary to modify the client or modify the 
kernel when monitoring the client. This leaves traces, 
making it easy for malicious programs to discover and 
create an anti-forensic response. Therefore, the main 
body of the monitor is placed in a virtual machine 
manager, and only the existing system interface is called 
to implement the monitoring of the memory record. 
4. LONG-TERM BEHAVIOR SIGNATURE BASED 
IDENTIFICATION METHOD 
4.1 Timing channel characters 
As shown in figure 1, during a typical transmission cycle of 
the timing channel, the confidential information is transmitted 
from the sender to the receiver located on different virtual 
machines. The sender of the timing channel encodes the 
information into binary bits and changes the properties of the 
shared resources according to the bits. The receiver observes the 
changes and decodes the confidential information from these 
changes. The sender and receiver predetermine the parameters and 
repeat the cycle until all the confidential information has been 
transmitted. 
Summarizing the above describes the long-term behavior 
signature of the timing channel: Repetitive access to a single 
shared resource over a period of time. 
There are two ways for the timing channel to encode 
information: Storage timing channel (STC): in the same time 
interval, the sender’s selection is active or silent. Activity 
represents one and silence is zero. Distinct timing channel (DTC): 
different time intervals for encoding information. For example, a 
long interval is one, and a short interval is zero, which can be seen 
on the network channel.  
During behavioral analysis, we use the network packet 
communication situation on the network channel to reflect the 
timing channel behavior. For the local channel, we acquire system 
operations from domU by adding a module into the hypervisor to 
intercept hypercalls, but additional changes to the hypervisor are 
required. Additionally, the system operation information, such as 
the time information, is not complete and cannot be accessed 
directly. To get complete information about the local channels, we 
investigate the memory access activity. 
The CPU accesses the memory to obtain data when it executes 
instructions or extracts data. There are three permissions for 
accessing memory. The execution permission is used for the 
instruction area of the processed memory area. For the data area, 
read and write permission are granted. After careful investigation, 
the transmission cycle of the timing channel is repeatedly executed 
to complete the data transmission. Every transmission cycle 
accesses the same area of instruction and data. Therefore, we 
observed the lower behavior to determine the regularity of the 
timing channel. Additionally, the probability of repeatedly 
executing the same instruction area is higher than the data area, so 
we focused on the memory data read operation to investigate 
timing channel characteristics. 
In conclusion, we identified the following signatures of the 
local channel in IaaS:  
I、 During the running of the timing channel which is always 
fixed to the same process. 
II、 During the running of the local channel, the process will 
repeatedly access the fixed memory page at intervals. For 
the network channel, the packet will repeatedly be sent 
at intervals or received from a fixed IP and port to a fixed 
IP and port. 
III、 The DTC behavior logs show the level of two different 
fixed intervals. 
IV、 The STC behavior logs show a variety of time intervals, 
and the maximum interval time should be an integer 
multiple of the minimum interval time. 
4.2 Detection method 
We designed an identification method based on the long-term 
behavior signature, despite the different records of three types of 
local channels. The input for our method is the interval time of the 
adjacent activity. Therefore, we pre-computed the interval time of 
the memory activity records. As shown in Algorithm 1, our method 
has the following phases:  
Figure1. Transmission procedure of Timing channel 
 
Found repeat operation: for the memory activity records, 
we first locate the memory page that was repeatedly accessed. In 
addition to the process of accessing, the repeated page should also 
be fixed. For packet records, the same IP and the same port that 
repeatedly sends out or receives incoming packets is targeted, and 
the destination IP and packets port should be fixed. As shown in 
lines 3 to 8, based on signatures I and II, we perform initial filtering 
to remove the meaningless records. Accessd() represents the access 
records of the memory page x. pid() represents the process of 
accessing the memory page x. RepeatThreshold represents the 
minimum number of accesses to the memory to determine the 
suspicious process. The default is set to 100. After the initial filter, 
the list of suspicious processes is added for the next analysis. 
Compute interval: We extracted and sorted the records of the 
previous suspicious process, then computed the interval time of the 
adjacent operations, as shown in lines 9 to 10. 
Sorted IA(inter-arrival) times list: we sort the interval time 
of the adjacent operations, as shown in line 11. 
Smoothness calculation: from the sorted list, we set the time 
thresholds, and we separate the similar IA times into each threshold. 
Then, we compute the relative difference in each threshold. We use 
line programming to compute the smoothness. For the timing 
channel, the regression coefficient should be close to zero in each 
threshold. For the timing channels, the majority of the pairwise 
differences in the sorted list of IA times will be very small. It is 
only large for jumps in the step function, as shown in lines 12 to 
22. We calculate the difference between adjacent thresholds. When 
the adjacent value difference is greater than K1, a new threshold is 
created. If the adjacent value difference is less than K1, the value 
is added. Finally, to calculate the regression coefficient b for each 
group, when b is less than K2, the data group is smooth and 
effective. K1 and K2 are set to 0.1 and 0.01 by default. 
 
Pattern match: as shown in lines 23 to 26, we identify 
several thresholds, based on signatures III and IV. The DTC will 
show two smoothness thresholds. The STC will show more than 
two smoothness thresholds, and the maximum threshold should be 
an integer multiple of the minimum threshold. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
The introduction of the memory activity record solves the 
challenge of finding meaningful information that can record the 
timing channel. Adding the recognition algorithm proposed above, 
we obtain the evidence acquisition and recognition function in the 
forensic process. Therefore, we add the evidence reservation and 
analysis module, which forms a complete set of forensics tools to 
achieve the forensics for the timing channel in the cloud 
environment. 
We implemented our prototype system on a desktop computer 
with an Intel® Core™ i5-3330 3.00 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM, and 
256 KB L2 cache. The version of Xen hypervisor was 4.4.3. 
Our system included a monitor, detector, evidence collector, 
and verifier module. The monitor collected the system operation 
records. The detector identified the suspicious processes on the 
timing channel from the records. The evidence controller collected 
the relevant evidence and stored it in the database. The verifier 
obtained the binary code of the suspicious process and analyzed 
the communication protocol to reconstruct the crime scene. 
5.1 Monitor and Detector 
We placed the monitor modules into dom0, which was 
transparent to domU. The monitor module was responsible for 
recording the memory activity. 
For the memory activity recording, we used Intel VT EPT  
[21] techniques to monitor the guest VM’s memory region. The 
monitoring information was delivered to dom0 using event 
channels provided by Xen. No modifications of the guest VMs 
were needed in the procedure. The monitor was first initialized 
using the vmi_init function. Then, the vmi_register_event function 
registered the memory events on the guest VM’s memory region 
to monitor the VM’s memory in real-time. To trigger the event, the 
access control mechanism in EPT was adopted to set the read 
permission on the target memory region. When a guest process 
wanted to access the memory page, a violation event was triggered 
and trapped in the hypervisor. Meanwhile, the access control was 
canceled to let the guest process continue executing. The violation 
Algorithm 1 identify timing channel 
1: Input: the memory activity records and network packet 
records 
2: Output: the suspicious process 
3: if accessd(x) >= RepeatThreshold 
4:   for I = 1 to accessd(x) 
5:     if pid[0](page(x)) != pid[i](x) 
6:       break 
7:   if i == accessd(x) 
8:     suspicious.add(x) 
9: for i = 1 to accessd(x) 
10:   interval.add(time[i](x) – time[i-1](x)) 
11: SORT(interval) 
12: for i = 1 to accessd(x) 
13:   if (|interval[i] - interval[i-1]|/ interval[i-1]) <= K1 
14:     group.add(interval[i]) 
15:   else 
16:     group.addGroup() 
17:     group.add(interval[i]) 
18: for i = 1 to length(group) 
19:   b = line_program(group[i]) 
20:   if b >= K2 
21:     suspicious.remove(x) 
22:     break 
23: if length(group) == 2 
24:     type = DTC 
25: else if length(group) > 2 and  
average(group[n]) % average(group[1]) == 0 
26:     type = STC 
 
Figure 2. The architecture of the monitor 
event was passed through the event channel in the Xen hypervisor, 
then the mem_monitor_cb function was called to handle it. 
Function mem_monitor_cb recorded crucial details such as PID, 
cr3, process name, access time, page, etc. After handling the 
violation event, the vmi_register_event function was invoked again 
to register the memory event to reset the access permission on that 
page and to wait for the next memory access request. 
Packet recordings were performed as follows. When the 
process sent a packet, the guest operating system wrote it to a 
virtual network interface card. We obtained the packet information 
using the libpcap tool. The structure pcap_pkthdr provided by the 
libpcap tool obtained accurate time information. When the 
libpacap received a packet and passed the packet to the monitor, 
the monitor recorded the packet information, including the source 
IP, source port, time, destination IP, destination port, etc. 
We placed the detector module in the dom0 which obtained 
records from the database to analyze. The outputs of the detector 
were the suspicious processes. When detecting the presence of the 
timing channel, the detector notified the evidence collector, while 
the next detection cycle continued probing the timing channel data 
and combining the data belonging to the same timing channel. 
5.2 Evidence Collector and Verifier 
When the evidence collector received the timing channel 
signal from the detector, it used the VMM introspection 
mechanism to obtain the guest memory dump through the 
command dump-core. The memory dump contained the evidence 
of the timing channel’s suspicious processes. 
The verifier was implemented as a volatility [24] plugin, 
which is a memory extraction utility framework. If the system 
detected the network channel, we extracted the network connection 
through the linux_netstat plugin, then identified the suspicious 
process using the corresponding suspicious port. After that, we 
began our memory analysis. We identified the suspicious processes’ 
memory address through the linux_proc_maps plugin. The 
linux_dump_map copied the data of the suspicious process. 
After obtaining the binary code from the suspicious process, 
the code was disassembled using the objdump tool. Then, we 
performed the static analysis based on the timing channel code 
signature. This step further confirmed the presence of the timing 
channel to reduce the false positives and obtain the communication 
protocol from the analysis of the communication code. 
In our prototype system, we stored the record in each step and 
traced the source of the evidence during the subsequent 
investigation. The entire system contained three databases to store 
the evidence: the monitor database, the detector database and the 
memory evidence database. The monitor database kept all of the 
records during monitoring. The detector database stored the data 
filtered by the identification and joined the suspicious process info 
in the original records. The memory evidence database held each 
suspicious process memory dump and the results of the binary code  
analysis. The records from the three databases were connected to 
form a complete chain of evidence to ensure the validity and 
integrity.  
Figure 3. Experiment on the local channel. (a) Memory activity records. (b) The IA records of memory page 0x195a0000. (c) 
The sorted IA. 
6. EVALUATION 
We tested the four typical local timing channels in our system. 
We ran Ubuntu14.04 in dom0 and two guest VMs, each of which 
was allocated 1024 MB of virtual memory. 
6.1 Case Study for the Local channel 
Considering the cache-based timing channel, we used the 
flush-reload code to simulate an attack, which used the cache-
based channels to extract the private encryption keys from a victim 
program running GnuPG. We ran the flush-reload spy program on 
domA and ran the GnuPG encryption program on domB. domA 
had the GnuPG encryption table address in domB and mapped to 
their memory address space. 
Step 1. As shown in Figure 3(a), we checked the monitoring 
records in domA. Then, we found the page 0x195a0000, which had 
repeatedly been accessed over a period of time. We marked it and 
checked the access. After comparison, we found that the process 
of accessing the page was always the PID for 2767 belonging to 
spy.exe.  
Step 2. As shown in Figure 3(b), we filtered out the accessing 
memory pages records 0x195a0000 and calculated the time 
interval between the two adjacent access records. 
Step 3. As shown in Figure 3(c), with the sorted IA list of the 
memory page 0x195a0000 access time, we filtered the 
meaningless thresholds, which had a count less than 5% of a total. 
In this case, we identified five thresholds. 
Step 4. Smoothness calculation. A meaningful threshold for 
the timing channel is smoothness. With the linear programming 
technique, the regression coefficient should be close to zero. We 
calculated the five thresholds. All the results were close to zero. 
Step 5. Pattern match. By comparing the regularity, we found 
its behavior pattern matched the STC pattern. That was the 
multiple integer relationship between the maximum threshold and 
the minimum threshold. In our records, the minimum interval was 
200000 ns. 
Step 6. After the timing channel was found, the evidence 
collector stored the memory dump of domA and domB. 
The additional information was used to determine the type of 
timing channel. We identified the suspicious process spy, and we 
also found the process of the GnuPG encryption program. The 
page activities were cross-performed, and the domA and domB 
shared a physical cache. Thus, it was determined that the currently 
running timing channel was a cache-based channel attack and its 
target was the GnuPG encryption process in domA. 
In conclusion, there was a timing channel attack in the domB, 
and we conducted a binary code analysis to confirm its existence 
with more evidence. 
When the suspicious process was detected, the system 
automatically extracted the current memory dump after the 
suspicious process was confirmed. We located the memory address 
of the process based on the PID record and then extracted data from 
the target memory for further evidence analysis. 
6.2 Case Study for the Network channel 
In this experiment, we simulated a simple IP timing channel. 
We set the different interval times (0.3 sec and 0.5 sec) for the 
entire communication. We ran the sender process on domA and the 
receiver on domB. An empty content UDP packet was transported 
between them. 
Figure4. experiment of network channel. (a) Sending packets records. (b) The packet interval pattern on port 48628. (c) The 
IA records of memory page 0x195a0000.  
Step 1. We reviewed the packet records and found packets 
repeatedly sending on port 48628 in domA. Then we determined 
whether its destination IP and port were fixed. We found all the 
packets sent to the IP belonged to domB on port 6789.  
Step 2. We filtered out the sending packets records by port 
48628 and calculated the time interval between two adjacent 
packet records. 
Step 3. By comparing the regular packet sending interval, we 
sorted the packet records IA and identified two meaningful 
thresholds. 
Step 4. Smoothness calculation. We calculated the two 
thresholds using the line program. All the regression coefficients 
were close to zero. 
Step 5. Pattern match. We identified two different interval 
thresholds; the high was 0.5 sec, and the low was 0.3 sec. This is a 
typical DTC pattern. 
Step 6. We located the suspicious process iptming.exe on port 
48628, then marked it and copied its process data. We 
disassembled the iptiming.exe binary code using the objdump tool 
and located the communication code. We found that its 
communication protocol was the DTC protocol. The time intervals 
were 0.3 seconds and 0.5 seconds. We defined the maximum 
interval to send 1 and the log interval to send 0. The IP timing 
channel communication protocol was restored, and the monitored 
records were consistent with the case. 
6.3 Effectiveness 
We introduced a similar approach to the study to evaluate 
the efficiency and performance of the proposed method. The 
similar methods in the current field use the two-phase synthesis 
detection algorithm presented by C2Hunter [15]. We also 
introduced the packet records detection method from network 
timing channel research, such as examining patterns in the 
variance and ϵ-similarity [17], which also uses the memory 
activity records for the input. 
The two-phase synthesis detection algorithm is synthesized 
using the Markov detection algorithm and the Bayesian detection 
algorithm. If the change pattern of the shared resource properties 
is closer to the Markov model, the sequence of the operations is 
transferring confidential information through a timing channel. 
The normal operation sequences are modeled into the Bayesian 
model. If an operation sequence deviates from the Bayesian model, 
a timing channel occurs. Markov and Bayesian models in the two-
phase synthesis algorithm are complementary. The Markov 
detector detects the timing channels, and the Bayesian detector 
distinguishes the timing channels from the normal operation 
sequences. 
Examining patterns in the variance: This method 
examines whether the variance in the IA remains constant. The 
traffic is separated into non-overlapping windows. For each 
window, the standard deviation of the IA times is computed. To 
compute the heuristic measure of regularity, the pairwise 
differences between the window for each pair is calculated. Finally, 
to obtain a summary statistic, the standard deviation of the pairwise 
differences is computed.  
ϵ-Similarity: The measure is derived from the sorted IA times. 
From this sorted list, the relative difference between each pair of 
consecutive points is computed. Then, a measure of similarity is 
computed, ϵ-Similarity, by computing the percentage of relative 
differences that are less than ϵ. 
This process resulted in a good detection rate but had more 
false positives. To test the effectiveness of our method, we set up 
datasets with different conditions, which were classified into two 
groups, normal condition, and noise condition. The noise condition 
included many extra normal processes running beside the timing 
channel. Each dataset was tested at least 1000 times in our 
Local channel Without detector With Hypercall detector With memory detector 
Overload(%) with Hypercall 
detector 
Overload(%) with memory 
detector 
Cache based 13550.6(ms) 19106.35(ms) 18293.31(ms) 34 31 
Load based 600.5(s) 858.715(s) 876.73(s) 43 41 
Share memory 325.5(s) 481.74(s) 465.465(s) 45 42 
Dataset 



















Normal  1.13  12.31  10.0  1.33 
cache channel 93.33 1.89 76.33 13.26 91.85 12.1 99.97 1.06 
load based channel 95.24 4.46 72.32 15.31 87.46 13.21 99.6 1.11 
share memory channel 97.57 2.53 74.27 14.89 84.94 13.89 98.59 1.21 
IP timinmg channel   60.52 16.55 85.10 10.50 99.50 1.66 
Flush-reload 93.29 2.12 75.21 13.51 90.54 12.25 99.67 2.09 
Cache channel with noise 80.21 10.24 40.51 33.16 67.35 23.51 98.3 2.1 
Load based with noise 79.56 12.31 44.37 34.22 61.23 29.3 99.31 3.13 
Share memory with noise 75.43 13.57 50.12 32.51 62.91 28.47 98.82 2.29 
IP timing channel with noise   45.66 20.45 75.66 23.66 98.33 5.15 
Flush-reload with noise 73.21 13.81 41.28 32.67 66.95 22.71 99.12 4.1 
Table2. performance on memory detector and Hypercall detector 
Table1. Detection results of the local channel 
experiments. 
As shown in Table 1, under normal conditions, except the 
variance, the others had a high success rate and low FP (false 
positive). However, on the noise condition, the two-phase, 
variance and ϵ-similarity had significant differences in the success 
rate and FP. Thus, the noise from the normal processes was still a 
key factor in the impact of false positives. From the experimental 
results, our method maintained a high success rate, more than 98%, 
even under noise conditions, which means our method is more 
stable and the timing channel behavioral characteristics were 
accurately summarized.  
6.4 Performance 
Currently, placing a hook on the kernel to obtain the 
hypercalls log is the main input of the timing channel detection 
methods. Our method first proposed the memory activities records 
as the basic input. Thus, our main concern was the different 
performance impacts between them. 
To ensure the accuracy of the detection, we reduced the 
impact on the timing channel to ensure its normal operation and to 
avoid timing channel antidetection. We conducted three controlled 
experiments to observe the impact of the detector on the 
performance of the timing channel. Except for the two-phase, 
which was the hypercalls detector, the others used the memory 
detector, including the method introduced from the network 
channel detection. For the network packets monitoring, the 
existing research was used to intercept the network card was 
implemented in the same way as our method, so it was not 
compared. 
Our prototype system runs on the operating system, which 
means if the system is busier, it will cause a certain overload using 
real-time monitoring. As shown in Table 2, the load-based and 
share memory timing channel have more CPU consumption, and 
the overload is higher than the cache-based channel. The average 
increase was 10%. The overload difference was lower between the 
hypercall detector and the memory detector. The memory detector 
was only lower than the hypercall detector by approximately 3%, 
which is acceptable for users and does not affect the stability of the 
guest VM. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We tested four typical cross-VM timing channels in IaaS and 
obtained a satisfactory result. However, the upgraded versions of 
these channels were not tested, nor were other types of timing 
channels such as memory bus-based, hard drive, etc. Therefore, 
more long-term signatures of these timing channels must be 
summarized to improve the identification algorithm.  
The memory activities records and packet records are a good 
basis for further research. More research on network timing 
channel detection is recommended. Some of the analysis methods 
used for the network packets can also be used for the memory 
activity. In this paper, the variance and ϵ-similarity method from 
the network channel both had a good result. 
The basic idea of our method applies to many kinds of virtual 
machine systems. Next, complete and stable systems can be 
implemented on other virtualization platforms such as VMware 
VBOX, etc. 
In the paper, we investigated timing channels in IaaS, 
summarized the behavior signatures of these timing channels, and 
then proposed a method to identify and investigate timing channels 
based on the signature. We designed a complete set of forensics 
steps and implemented our prototype system on Xen. The 
experimental result showed that the prototype successfully 
identifies these timing channels, even under the disturbances from 
normal processes. 
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